SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
NOTICE OF EXEMPT SOLICITATION (VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION)
NAME OF REGISTRANT: McDonald’s Corporation
NAME OF PERSON RELYING ON EXEMPTION: SOC Investment Group
ADDRESS OF PERSON RELYING ON EXEMPTION: 1707 L Street,
N.W., Suite 350, Washington, D.C. 20036
Written materials are submitted pursuant to Rule
14a-6(g)(1) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
April 21, 2025
Please vote AGAINST Director Paul Walsh (Item 1i), Chair of the
Corporate Responsibility Committee, for failing to respond to a majority-supported shareholder proposal at the McDonald’s Corp.
(NYSE: MCD) annual meeting on May 20, 2025.
Dear fellow McDonald’s Corporation Shareholders:
SOC Investment Group urges you to vote AGAINST the re-election of Director
Paul Walsh at this year’s Annual meeting of Shareholders on May 20, 2025. In 2023, we submitted a shareholder proposal requesting
improved lobbying disclosures, which received the majority support of votes cast at that year’s annual meeting. As chair of the
Corporate Responsibility Committee, Director Walsh bears responsibility for the McDonald’s Corporation’s (the “Company”
or “McDonald’s”) failure to implement the 2023 majority-supported proposal. Since 2011, investors have filed numerous
shareholder proposals requesting lobbying disclosure reports that include federal and state lobbying amounts, payments to trade associations
and social welfare groups used for lobbying, and payments to tax-exempt organizations that write and endorse model legislation. These
proposals have achieved majority support on 13 occasions, including our 2023 proposal at McDonald’s.1
Since our proposal received majority support in 2023, the Company has
failed to:
| I. | Meaningfully engage with the proponents of the majority-supported proposal; and |
| a. | the policies and procedures governing McDonald’s lobbying practices, |
| b. | easily accessible, specific payments by the company used for direct or indirect lobbying, or grassroots lobbying. |
The SOC Investment Group works with pension funds sponsored by unions
affiliated with the Strategic Organizing Center (SOC), a coalition of unions representing millions of members, to enhance long-term shareholder
value through active ownership. These funds have over $250 billion in assets under management and are long-term McDonald’s shareholders.
As discussed below, we have previously engaged with McDonald’s on various issues, but did not receive a meaningful engagement from
the Company on the implementation of our majority-supported proposal.
_____________________________
1 Proxy Preview, New SEC Rules Undermine Lobbying Disclosure
Proposals,
https://www.proxypreview.org/contributor-articles-2025/new-sec-rules-undermine-lobbying-disclosure-proposals.
Director Walsh has failed to oversee implementation of a majority-supported
proposal
The proposal received more than 50% shareholder support at the 2023
annual meeting.2 At the time of the vote until July 2024, the now dissolved Public Policy and Strategy Committee had oversight
of public policy-related shareholder proposals.3 Director Walsh is the Chair of the Corporate Responsibility Committee, which
oversees “government relations as part of [McDonald’s] broader public policy engagement and priorities” and would appear
to now be responsible for implementing the lobbying proposal.4 Following the vote, McDonald’s informed us that updates
to the disclosure were forthcoming; however, the changes the Company made did not address the concerns raised in the proposal.
Upon seeing
McDonald’s insufficient updates, we attempted to engage with the Company to address the shortcomings. Despite engaging with us to
discuss other topics, the Company did not engage on the topic of the majority-supported lobbying proposal. Throughout our communication
with McDonald’s, there was no participation from any member of the Corporate Responsibility Committee, despite lobbying falling
squarely within the scope of its responsibilities. We believe the lack of responsiveness to this majority-supported proposal and the lack
of engagement with the proponent of the proposal is a failure of Director Walsh to fulfill his duties as Chair of the Corporate
Responsibility Committee.
McDonald’s lobbying updates do not adequately address the
concerns raised in the proposal
Following the 2023 annual meeting, McDonald’s updated its Public
Policy Engagement website. However, the updates do not address the concerns raised in our proposal, particularly around the transparency
and accessibility of lobbying disclosures. The focus of the updates, in fact, appears to be on the political contribution policy, which
has historically been considered separate from lobbying policies. Our proposal requested that McDonald’s publish a description of
the policies and procedures governing the Company’s lobbying practices, which do not appear in the updates. Nor is there a description
of management’s decision-making process to engage in lobbying, or a description of how the Board evaluates McDonald’s lobbying
initiatives beyond that the “Board receives reports detailing McDonald’s . . . federal and state government lobbying activities.”5
Further, McDonald’s still does not disclose contributions to
501(c)(3) and 501 (c)(4) groups. McDonald’s discloses memberships to trade associations of which it is a member and pays dues of
$25,000 or more, however it does not provide exact contribution amounts as the proposal requested. Finally, the majority-supported lobbying
proposal requested that McDonald’s disclose yearly federal and state lobbying expenditures, with federal and state totals being
broken out. Last year, McDonald’s published a document providing links to the lobbying databases of states in which the Company
had lobbied in the previous year. This document does not provide shareholders with the contribution totals as the proposal had requested.
It also fails to address shareholders’ concerns about the difficulty in accessing lobbying information. The links provided by the
Company do not all offer specific contribution amounts, and in some cases give no information on contribution amounts at all. To date,
McDonald’s response to the majority-supported shareholder proposal on lobbying disclosures has been wholly insufficient. In its
updates, McDonald’s has failed to implement the proposal’s core requests, and the changes that the Company has made do not
address the primary goal of enhanced disclosure as raised by the proposal.
_____________________________
2 McDonald’s Form 8-K, https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/63908/000006390823000059/mcd-20230525.htm.
3 McDonald’s 2024 Proxy Statement, p. 38, https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0000063908/000155837024004818/mcd-20240522xdef14a.htm;
McDonald’s 2025 Proxy Statement, p. 34, https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0000063908/000155837025004544/mcd-20250520xdef14a.htm.
4 McDonald’s Public Policy Engagement Website, https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/corpmcd/investors/corporate-governance/policital-contributions-and-policy.html;
McDonald’s Corporation Corporate Responsibility Committee Charter, https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/content/dam/sites/corp/nfl/pdf/CORPORATE-RESPONSIBILITY-COMMITTEE-CHARTER-2025.pdf.
5 McDonald’s Public Policy Engagement Website; https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/corpmcd/investors/corporate-governance/policital-contributions-and-policy.html.
Conclusion
The Company and its Directors have failed to properly engage with the
proponents to discuss concerns around the Company’s implementation of the proposal. We urge you to vote AGAINST Director Paul Walsh,
Chair of the Corporate Responsibility Committee at this year’s annual general meeting on May 20, 2025.
THIS IS NOT A PROXY
SOLICITATION AND NO PROXY CARDS WILL BE ACCEPTED
Please
execute and return your proxy card according to McDonald’s instructions.
McDonalds (NYSE:MCD)
Graphique Historique de l'Action
De Mai 2025 à Juin 2025
McDonalds (NYSE:MCD)
Graphique Historique de l'Action
De Juin 2024 à Juin 2025