NEW YORK, March 26, 2013 /PRNewswire/ -- P. Schoenfeld
Asset Management LP ("PSAM") and its investment advisory clients,
which together own shares of MetroPCS Communications, Inc. ("PCS"
or the "Company") valued at approximately $100 million at today's prices, responded today
to a letter sent to PCS shareholders on March 25, 2013 by PCS Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer Roger Linquist and
the PCS Board of Directors. In its response to the PCS
letter, PSAM corrected the many inaccuracies communicated to
shareholders by the Company and raised additional questions that
remain unanswered by PCS and its Board of Directors relating to
PCS's proposed transaction with T-Mobile USA, Inc (the "Proposed Transaction").
Full text of the letter PSAM sent to the PCS Board of
Directors is attached.
PSAM encourages PCS shareholders to vote AGAINST the
Proposed Transaction at the April 12,
2013 Special Meeting using the WHITE card provided
with the proxy materials.
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March 26, 2013
Members of the Board of Directors
MetroPCS Communications Inc.
2250 Lakeside Boulevard
Richardson, TX
75082
Dear Board Members:
We read your letter to shareholders dated March 25, 2013, with significant frustration and
confusion. In your letter, you stated that our firm, P.
Schoenfeld Asset Management LP ("PSAM"), has an agenda that somehow
runs counter to that of other MetroPCS Communications, Inc. ("PCS"
or the "Company") shareholders with respect to the proposed
T-Mobile USA, Inc. ("T-Mobile")
transaction (the "Proposed Transaction")—nothing could be further
from the truth and we take exception that you have characterized
our efforts to realize the greatest value possible for all PCS
shareholders as "distracting" from other important matters at
hand. It is clear from the analysis we completed and
published in our white paper dated March 18,
2013, and the analysis completed by many independent
analysts, that PCS shareholders will receive superior value through
the alternative scenarios we outlined in which the Company remains
independent. The value of the stand-alone alternative has a much
higher level of certainty than the "stub" interests shareholders
would receive in a business combination with T-Mobile.
Our "agenda," as you refer to it, is to obtain fair value for
all PCS shareholders and ensure the PCS Board of Directors pursues
a transparent transaction process that reflects realistic
assessments and accurate information. To date, you
have failed to provide PCS shareholders with accurate or
transparent data related to critical aspects of the proposed
T-Mobile transaction ("Proposed Transaction") and have, in many
instances, distorted or obfuscated the facts and figures regarding
the Proposed Transaction.
In your letter, you repeatedly referred to complicated and
opaque calculations and fee amounts that directly contradict the
figures you provided in your revised definitive proxy statement and
these calculations are also not supported by any back-up
materials. We hope you will clarify these numbers and provide
reasonable and meaningful detail on how you calculated them, as we
did in our letter to the PCS Board dated January 30, 2013 and our white paper dated
March 18, 2013.
In reviewing the provisions of the pricing schedule to the
$15 billion in intercompany notes
(the "DT Notes") to be owed to Deutsche Telekom AG ("DT") (Exhibit
F to the Business Combination Agreement filed with the Company's
revised definitive proxy statement) and the Form of Description of
Notes (Exhibit G to the Business Combination Agreement), we were
particularly concerned that you clearly either fail to understand
the basic provisions of the applicable indentures or are misstating
the provisions of those securities to serve the PCS Board's own
agenda.
We hope you will promptly provide additional information
regarding the following inaccurate or misleading statements
communicated in your letter to PCS
shareholders:
The letter states that the "call protection and make-whole
provisions" do not deter future M&A transactions because "any
redemption in connection with a change in control would be at 101%
of par."
- This is astounding because it leads one to believe that Mr.
Linquist and the PCS Board do not understand the difference between
a call provision, which is a right of the debtor, and the "101%
change of control put" provision in the DT Notes, which would inure
to the benefit of the holder of the debt security, which is
DT. If PCS truly misunderstands these basic provisions in
the DT Notes, we would strongly suggest that the Board and the
Company should not have been negotiating these DT Notes.
- Under a change of control, a potential acquirer of the combined
PCS/T-Mobile company (the "Combined Company") upon consummation of
the Proposed Transaction can only call the notes when callable at
specified prices or under the make-whole provisions. These
bonds have non-call provisions for 2-6 years. A potential
acquirer of the Combined Company would not have the right to redeem
the bonds at 101%—that right is exclusive to the holder,
which is DT. Such a right will never be exercised because
the notes will be trading far above that level given the above
market interest rate on notes. If you, DT and your advisors
intended these notes to be callable at 101% by the Combined
Company or a future owner but failed to write the provisions
correctly, we would be happy to provide you with the appropriate
language for the indentures.
The letter states that the DT debt avoids "significant
financing and underwriting fees" in the amount of $1.3 billion.
- No calculation has been provided to PCS shareholders to compute
these fees and we don't understand how this number is
possible. The total enterprise value of PCS is approximately
$6 billion, after netting
$2.6 billion in cash. Is the
thinking that the market fee for doing this deal would be 20% of
PCS's total enterprise value? Even if the $1.3 billion is based on the $15 billion in DT Notes, this would result in
8.7% in fees versus only approximately 86 basis points of fees on
the new notes that PCS recently issued. It seems totally
implausible to us that any underwriter gave you a quote of 8.7% in
fees, so please clarify who provided this number. PCS
shareholders deserve clarity on this issue.
The letter states that the 7.7% weighted average interest
rate cited in PSAM's report is based on mistaken assumptions and a
misunderstanding of the year-end pro-forma financials disclosed in
the amended definitive proxy.
- This interest rate was taken directly from page 219 of PCS's
revised definitive proxy statement filed on March 12, 2013 and is not an assumption of PSAM's
at all. The revised proxy statement says: "[t]he estimated
committed interest rates for the $15.0
billion senior notes are 8.16% and
7.28% for the permanent notes ($7.5
billion) and reset notes ($7.5
billion), respectively."
- The "reference yield," which is based on comparable indices and
securities, including existing PCS bonds, is further adjusted with
the following additions:
- 100 basis points for reset notes or 187.5 basis points for
non-reset notes; and
- A combined maturity adjustment and distribution fee (which both
DT and PCS deny exist) of 33 basis points for reset notes or 34
basis points for non-reset notes (assuming an eight-year
term).
- Does the 7.2% rate, which PCS claims is the current blended
rate of the DT debt, take into account the 200 basis points
original issue discount ("OID") "distribution fee" imbedded in the
interest rate?
- There is a specific mechanism for pricing these notes.
The PCS Board should explain this calculation so that PCS
shareholders can determine for themselves whether the fees and OID
that you impute into the pricing of the notes represent a true
"market mechanism."
The letter states that the intercompany note spread is
reasonable.
- Why should the notes have any spread? This is an
intercompany note with an inherently conflicted parent, DT –
why shouldn't DT's interests be aligned with PCS shareholders'
interests in the Combined Company?
The letter states that the combined leverage is appropriate
and in line with peers.
- Why do you leave out two (Verizon and AT&T) of the Combined
Company's three key national competitors when evaluating peer
leverage?
- Why was EBITDA for the last 12 months used in calculating
leverage as opposed to Estimated 2013 EBITDA, which will reflect
far less favorably on the Combined Company? The Combined
Company's EBITDA will decrease year over year while its peers will
increase year over year. Furthermore, you must already
understand that the Combined Company's 2013 EBITDA-Capex to
interest coverage is only 0.8x (assuming mid-point of estimated
synergies and one-time costs in Year 1).
- Why was a $1.5 billion charge for
PCS spectrum included when your letter stated that additional
spectrum is required to meet growing consumer demand for wireless
data: "to meet growing consumer demand for wireless
data, all carriers, including MetroPCS, need additional
spectrum?" This charge is not explained and seems
incongruous to us.
- We have recalculated the leverage ratios using 2013 EBITDA
and excluding the $1.5 billion charge
for PCS spectrum to be consistent with your previous statements,
and have included Verizon and AT&T in our analysis below.
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Leap
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PF
Sprint
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MetroPCS
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NewCo
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AT&T
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Verizon
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LTM
EBITDA
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Gross
Leverage
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5.7x
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5.4x
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3.1x
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3.6x
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1.7x
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1.4x
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Net
Leverage
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4.4x
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2.2x
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1.4x
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3.4x
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1.6x
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1.3x
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2013E
EBITDA
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Gross
Leverage
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6.5x
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4.8x
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3.5x
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3.9x
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1.7x
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1.3x
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Net
Leverage
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5.1x
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2.0x
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1.6x
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3.6x
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1.6x
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1.2x
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S&P
Rating
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B-
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B+
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B+
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BB
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A-
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A-
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The letter refers to "proposed synergies" as "detailed" and
"realistic."
- The PCS Investor Presentation on the Proposed Transaction dated
March 18, 2013 and PCS's revised
definitive proxy statement both clearly state that the projections
are "preliminary" and are "subject to change."
- Most importantly, on a cumulative basis not one dollar of positive cash flow from synergies
occurs until YEAR 5, despite paying billions of "one-time
costs" associated with realizing these synergies. PCS's weak
stock price reflects the market's belief that these synergies are
unlikely to be realized.
- Lastly, in suggesting that the Combined Company reduce leverage
by $4.0 billion, PSAM outlined how
all parties would benefit from the attendant advantages of lower
leverage. PSAM never suggested that such a reduction should
be accompanied by a reduction in the equity split. Even with
the proposed reduction in leverage, the equity split is inadequate
and does not include a premium for PCS (in a transaction in
which it is clearly selling control to DT). See PSAM's white
paper dated March 18, 2013 for recent
comparable deal multiples.
There is a clear and critical difference between how PSAM views
the terms and pricing of the DT Notes and how the PCS Board is
representing the terms and pricing of the DT Notes to PCS
shareholders. Since we believe that most of the value DT is
extracting in the Combined Company is through the excessive and
expensive DT Notes, why shouldn't PCS shareholders receive the same
pro rata treatment that DT is receiving, or otherwise
provide an opportunity for PCS shareholders to elect those very
same notes at par for $14 per share
of PCS stock (note that $14 per share
is at the low end of the valuation range as detailed on page 41 of
PCS's investor presentation dated March
18, 2013)? This would allow PCS shareholders to choose
to keep the notes that we think are under-priced, and the PCS Board
and DT can keep the stock that you think is under-priced.
The PSAM team is willing to put its money where its mouth is –
we fully stand behind our positions and proposal. As the
ultimate guardians of PCS shareholder value, are you willing to do
the same?
Signed,
The PSAM Team
*****************************************************************************************************
On March 12, 2013, P. Schoenfeld
Asset Management LP, P. Schoenfeld Asset Management GP LLC and
Peter M. Schoenfeld (collectively, the "PSAM Group") filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") a
definitive proxy statement (the "Definitive Proxy Statement")
relating to the solicitation of proxies by the PSAM Group from
stockholders of MetroPCS Communications, Inc. ("MetroPCS") in
connection with the special meeting of stockholders to be held on
April 12, 2013 to vote upon matters
relating to the proposed combination of MetroPCS with T-Mobile
USA, Inc. STOCKHOLDERS
OF METROPCS ARE URGED TO READ THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS FILED WITH THE SEC RELATING TO SUCH SOLICITATION
CAREFULLY IN THEIR ENTIRETY BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT
INFORMATION, INCLUDING INFORMATION RELATING TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN
SUCH SOLICITATION. The Definitive Proxy Statement and form of WHITE
proxy card will be furnished to some or all of the stockholders of
MetroPCS and will, along with other relevant documents filed with
the SEC, be available free of charge at the SEC's website at
http://www.sec.gov. In addition, the PSAM Group will provide copies
of the Definitive Proxy Statement and accompanying WHITE proxy card
without charge upon request.
About PSAM
P. Schoenfeld Asset Management LP (together
with its affiliates, "PSAM") was founded by Peter M. Schoenfeld and has been providing
investment advisory services since 1997. PSAM invests on
behalf of its clients in both equity and credit securities in
global event driven opportunities, including: international
consolidations, corporate restructurings, spin-offs, divestitures,
and stressed and distressed credits. PSAM has offices in
New York and London, which are registered with the SEC and
authorised and regulated by the FSA, respectively.
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SOURCE P. Schoenfeld Asset Management (PSAM)