IMRSQ Imris Inc (CE)

Item 1. Reports to Stockholders.

The following is a copy of the report to shareholders pursuant to Rule 30e-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (17 CFR 270.30e-1).

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DEAR FELLOW SHAREHOLDERS:

The six months ending December 31, 2012 marked another volatile period for equity markets and, in particular, small cap growth stocks. While the aggregate benchmark performance was solid for the period, the swings in between were both violent and unpredictable. An analysis of intraday highs and lows shows that the Russell 2000 Growth Index fell nearly 7.5% in the early weeks of the six-month period. That was followed by a 13.5% rally, a subsequent 12.3% decline and then a more than 10% return to close out the first half of our fiscal year. In the end, the Russell 2000 Growth Index returned 5.30% while the Cortina Small Cap Growth Fund lagged meaningfully with a slight negative return.

The moodiness of the market can be traced in large part to a series of macro events and public policy decisions (or rhetoric pertaining to policy). To recap just a few, the public assurance by ECP President Mario Draghi that his organization was committed to sustaining liquidity in Europe and the U.S. Federal Reserve’s reload on monetary stimulus through another quantitative easing program known as QE3 are largely responsible for the August/September rally. Uncertainty heading into and immediately following the U.S. political elections were at center stage for the subsequent decline. Remarkably, the final positive push into year-end occurred despite the hand wringing and political posturing surrounding the looming fiscal cliff.

These periods of macro-driven “risk-on/risk-off” trading are often difficult periods for our strategy that is rooted in investing in individual companies based on their company-specific fundamentals. In addition, there were several style headwinds that our strategy faced in the fourth calendar quarter when our underperformance occurred. Generally speaking, value stocks outperformed growth stocks, micro caps significantly underperformed small and mid cap stocks, stocks of rapidly growing companies underperformed those of slower growth companies, and companies were rewarded for paying dividends. While this perspective helps to explain some of the difficulties our strategy faced, we ultimately must own up to the lackluster results and recognize that challenging headwinds should not necessarily lead to underperformance…especially of the magnitude that we experienced.

From a sector standpoint, the largest contributor to our poor relative performance was the Consumer Discretionary sector where our holdings reported a disproportionate amount of disappointing results. Within this sector, four of the five biggest detractors from performance were eliminated from the portfolio, as we deemed their issues to be more structural than transitory. In two cases, competitive concerns led us to question the long-term profitability prospects of the companies in question. The second biggest contributor to negative returns was the Health Care sector. While our Health Care holdings modestly outperformed those of the benchmark, it was the worst performing sector in the benchmark and our overweight position proved costly. The difficulties faced in this sector were more macro/politically driven than company specific and we continue to hold all but three of our ten worst performing Health Care holdings over the six-month period. The Technology and Producer Durables (aka Industrials) sectors were also meaningful contributors to our underperformance. In these sectors, our holdings posted positive returns, but failed to keep pace with the robust sector returns in the benchmark.

In summary, our performance was not up to task in the first half of our fiscal year. Our style was out of favor, we did not have enough exposure to the best sectors and, most damaging of all, we had several company-specific disappointments. We are humbled by periods such as these, but remain steadfast in our commitment to fundamental research and our strategy of investing in high quality, high growth small cap companies.

Investing involves risks, including loss of principal.

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Growth of $25,000 Investment (Unaudited)

For the period from September 30, 2011 (Inception) to December 31, 2012.

This graph assumes an initial $25,000 investment at September 30, 2011 (Inception Date). The Cortina Small Cap Growth Fund (the “Fund”) will deduct a 2.00% redemption proceeds fee on Fund shares held 60 days or less. This graph depicts the performance of the Fund versus the Russell 2000 ^® Growth Index. It is important to note the Fund is a professionally managed mutual fund while the index is not available for investment and is unmanaged. The comparison is shown for illustrative purposes only.

This chart does not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on Fund distributions or the redemption of Fund shares.

Performance Returns for the period ended December 31, 2012

Past performance does not guarantee future results. The performance data quoted represents past performance and current returns may be lower or higher. Total return figures include change in share price, reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The investment return and principal value will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed may be worth more or less than their original cost. To obtain performance information current to the most recent month end, call 1-855-612-3936.

Russell 2000 ^® Growth Index measures the performance of the small-cap growth segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell 2000 companies with higher price-to-value ratios and higher forecasted growth values. All indices are unmanaged. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.

Sector Allocations ^***

*** Percentages are based on net assets as of December 31, 2012. Holdings are subject to change.

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DEAR FELLOW SHAREHOLDERS:

The Cortina Small Cap Value Strategy performed well, earning solid returns well in excess of its benchmark, the Russell 2000 Value, for the six months ending December 31, 2012. For the calendar year, stock selection overwhelmingly drove the outperformance, with particular strength in Financial Services, Producer Durables and Health Care. The strategy had multiple investments pay off handsomely. Cash and Utilities were barely measureable drags, and while there were several mistaken investments our risk control processes minimized the impact. Performance was not a case of a few well-placed wagers, it was the product of disciplined capital allocation.

Half Life, Half Lies, and Half Values

Market experts often state, with great self-regard, that “this time it’s different” are the four most expensive words ever spoken. They are probably referring to their television appearance per diems. Televised experts are frequently more expert in cliché than in capital allocation, political pundits included. True investors should know the most expensive words of investing are “reversion to the mean.” Failure to recognize change is a common trap.

In the bright white lights of history and business, ideas, facts and, indeed, companies have similar lifetimes. The highest return on a new fact, theory, or business is at its beginning because its accuracy, relevance, and novelty decline at a pace that is surprisingly mathematical in real life and practice. Samuel Arbesman recently wrote in The Half Life of Facts: Why Everything We Know Has an Expiration Date (Penguin, 2012) , that decline can be thought of as a half-life; a term generally reserved for the discussion of radioactive elements.

In the very big picture, the slow fall of Communism is a real example. The Cold War was a real experience for those who are over 35 years of age today. Experts may disagree with the peak of Communism, at least as it was shown in its demonstration project of the Soviet Union, but it could be argued that it peaked mid 20th century. Roughly one-half of the world allied itself with the Soviets, and one-half with the United States. Mid-century school children were raised in the belief that war was inevitable, and the other side was terrifically powerful. But internal half-life decay was already well underway for the Soviets. Its economy was weak, and the deterioration began methodically eating away at Communism’s mass. Its influence shrank, retreating from Central America, retreating from Afghanistan, retreating from Eastern Europe. Suddenly the Berlin Wall was gone and, poof, the entire empire appears to have never existed. The idea, once taken as fact, was no more. Communism, and its patron Russia, despite regaining some influence, has never reverted to its mean power of the past century.

In our hamlet of the world, the concept that equities have half lives well illuminates the challenge of investing on valuation alone. Lower valuation companies frequently appear inexpensive based upon their own past, but the future decline of a company often only manifests itself gradually. Firms previously recognized as leaders slowly lose their competitive edge, then flail about trying to reverse that trend and their decline accelerates. Investors’ view of the company goes from seeing a once great icon having a tough day, to a now average company with the potential to regain greatness, to a terrible company whose prime has past, to an uninvestable disaster. Nokia’s great competitive advantage a decade ago was its software. Poof. The struggling company now uses Microsoft software on its phones; itself a former leader humbled. The ghost of Ozymandias reappears. Let us not forget, Long-Term Capital Management had two Nobel winners gracing its pedigreed founders, but famously collapsed when the half-life of its reversion to the mean strategy played out.

The warning for investors is that while it is true certain companies can undergo a tough time and rebound, it is exceedingly rare. The assumption of reversion to the mean presumes, naively, that a company which once earned a 15% operating margin can do so again should it fall short during some period of time. Perhaps. More likely, however, is that company will not. In fact, that company is gone. Its dominance or its advantage is gone and, like many declining companies, its stock chart probably resembles a sliding board. Underperformance slowly then all at once: a value trap.

Therefore, evolution may be the wrong term for us to use. Alchemy might be better. When we buy a stake in a company, we are not buying the struggling company. We are buying a different company emerging from the previous. Each company we invest in is actually a start up, but in a different phase than what is commonly associated with the term. It is an important distinction, because simply assuming things will return to what they once were is a perilous strategy. In fact, each time it is different, and not recognizing that key distinction is the genus of many a turn into the wrong venture.

Whether it is evolution or alchemy, two recurring themes in our successful investments have been earnings and cash flow. First, companies who have changed and are on the cusp of growing earnings, typically after several quarters or years of stagnation, are often our best investments. Consensus estimates are usually both too low and too careless to capture the true value of internal improvements. Second, companies with high free cash flow that, either because of balance sheet repair or slowing capital needs, suddenly have prospects to either invest for the future or return capital to shareholders are fertile fields. Whether it is high leverage or high growth spending restraining free cash flow, crossing the inflection point from cash according to its needs to cash according to its wants can create significant opportunity for managements and shareholders.

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It is with these observations that we find investing in Growth at a Reasonable Price, marketed as GARP, such a treacherous path. It presumes all growth is good, enduring, and a bargain to be exploited when found. We much prefer to think of ourselves as investors in the school of A Reasonable Price with Growth, or ARPG for short. We are much more interested in the positive change that drives growth in an ignored company than in the negative change that creates a lower price in a well known one. ARPG may lack the mellifluous quality that GARP shows in marketing literature but it does resemble an acronym the military would use. We much prefer aligning ourselves with an organization known for its process and discipline than a term livening up spiral bound handouts remembered for making things appear better than they are.

Our Outlook

In this age of shrunken leadership, cynicism has taken hard root in the country. One year ago, the market’s worst fears were a slowing economy, the re-election of a business-unfriendly President and falling off the fiscal cliff. All three were realized in part or whole, proving the cynics correct. Yet cynics squirreling away their capital in seemingly safe investments paid the opportunity cost in foregone gains as the market rose healthily. Optimism does have its rewards and we retain ours.

Following last year’s strong performance is a tough act, but the process used to generate last year’s returns is not different from the process we will employ for next year’s returns. We have found values in new areas. We are less overweight Industrials than we once were and more overweight Technology. Financials remain an important sector, but less appealing than a year ago, while Energy has some unique situations. Consumer Discretionary remains a slight underweight, but we have sold some winning investments within the sector to focus on others with greater potential.

Although we may have opinions on the economy, we do not have a particular view on it. Stuck in the mud is about as precise a view as one can have these days given the complexity and stubborn qualities of both the problems and the actors defining the age. Adam Smith may have praised the virtues of many individuals acting in their own self-interest, but he had not witnessed the avariciousness of the United States Congress. The best solution is to shut off the news screen and focus on finding companies that are discovering their own means and paths to better days. It is a process we know well and will continue to employ in allocating your hard-earned capital.

Investing involves risks, including loss of principal.

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Growth of $25,000 Investment (Unaudited)

For the period from September 30, 2011 (Inception) to December 31, 2012.

This graph assumes an initial $25,000 investment at September 30, 2011 (Inception Date). The Cortina Small Cap Value Fund (the “Fund”) will deduct a 2.00% redemption proceeds fee on Fund shares held 60 days or less. This graph depicts the performance of the Fund versus the Russell 2000 ^® Value Index. It is important to note the Fund is a professionally managed mutual fund, while the index is not available for investment and is unmanaged. The comparison is shown for illustrative purposes only.

This chart does not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on Fund distributions or the redemption of Fund shares.

Performance Returns for the period ended December 31, 2012

Past performance does not guarantee future results. The performance data quoted represents past performance and current returns may be lower or higher. Total return figures include change in share price, reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The investment return and principal value will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed may be worth more or less than their original cost. To obtain performance information current to the most recent month end, call 1-855-612-3936.

Russell 2000 ^® Value Index measures the performance of those Russell 2000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth values. All indices are unmanaged. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.

Sector Allocations ^***

*** Percentages are based on net assets as of December 31, 2012. Holdings are subject to change.

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As a shareholder of the Fund(s), you incur transaction costs and ongoing costs, including management fees and other Fund expenses. This example is intended to help you understand your ongoing costs (in dollars) of investing in each Fund and to compare these costs with the ongoing costs of investing in other mutual funds. The example is based on an investment of $1,000 invested at the beginning of the period and held for the entire period, as indicated below.

Actual Expenses –The first line of the table below provides information about the actual account values and actual expenses. You may use the information in this line, together with the amount you invested, to estimate the expenses that you paid over the period. Simply divide your account value by $1,000 (for example, an $8,600 account value divided by $1,000 = 8.6) then multiply the result by the number in the first line under the heading entitled “Expenses Paid During Period” to estimate the expenses you paid on your account during this period.

Hypothetical Example for Comparison Purposes – The second line of the table below provides information about hypothetical account values and hypothetical expenses based on each Fund’s actual expense ratio and an assumed annual rate of return of 5% before expenses, which is not each Fund’s actual return. The hypothetical account values and expenses may not be used to estimate the actual ending account balance or expenses you paid for the period. You may use this information to compare the ongoing costs of investing in each Fund and other funds by comparing these 5% hypothetical examples with the 5% hypothetical examples that appear in the shareholder reports of other funds.

Please note that the expenses shown in the table are meant to highlight your ongoing costs only and do not reflect any direct costs, such as wire fees or low balance fees. Therefore, the second line of the table is useful in comparing ongoing costs and will not help you determine the relative total costs of owning different funds. In addition, if these direct costs were included, your costs would be higher.

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See Notes to Financial Statements.

See Notes to Financial Statements.

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