Performance Shares to vest and be paid: (i) less than 25th, (ii) 25th, (iii) 50th, and (iv) 100th. These percentile rankings will result in vesting and payment of a percentage of the ROC Target Opportunity, as follows: (i) 0%, (ii) 50%, (iii) 100%, and (iv) 200%, respectively. For example, if the Company’s performance were to place it at the 50th percentile of the Report Group, then 100% of the ROC Target Opportunity would vest and be paid. For performance between two established performance levels, the percentage of ROC Performance Shares to vest and be paid will be determined by mathematical interpolation. Notwithstanding the above, if the Company’s total return on capital is negative, then the percentage of the ROC Target Opportunity to be paid will be capped at 100%. ROC Performance Shares that do not vest will be automatically forfeited when the Compensation Committee makes its determination as to the extent to which the performance goal has been achieved, but no later than March 15, 2028.
Performance Shares with Relative Total Shareholder Return Performance Goal
On December 5, 2024, the Compensation Committee made the following grants of performance shares with a performance goal related to relative total shareholder return (“TSR Performance Shares”) to the principal executive officer, principal financial officer, and other named executive officers of the Company: D. P. Bauer, 23,422; T. J. Silverstein, 4,004; R. C. Kraemer, 21,698; J. I. Loweth, 11,929; and D. L. DeCarolis, 8,471. The grants were made under the 2010 Plan. A brief description of the principal terms and conditions of the TSR Performance Shares is provided below.
The number of TSR Performance Shares awarded to an officer is referred to as the officer’s “TSR Target Opportunity.” The performance cycle for the TSR Performance Shares is October 1, 2024 through September 30, 2027. Each TSR Performance Share will make the officer eligible to receive, no later than March 15, 2028 but in any event as soon as practicable after the Compensation Committee determines the extent to which the performance goal has been achieved, up to two shares of common stock of the Company (or the equivalent value in cash, as determined by the Compensation Committee), provided that the TSR Performance Shares will not vest and will be forfeited to the extent the performance goal is not achieved.
The performance goal for the October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2027 performance cycle is the Company’s three-year total shareholder return relative to the three-year total shareholder return of the other companies in the Report Group. Three-year total shareholder return for a given company will be based on the data reported for that company (with the starting and ending stock prices over the performance cycle calculated as the average closing stock price for the prior calendar month and with dividends reinvested in that company’s securities at each ex-dividend date) in the Bloomberg database at the time of analysis (or, if the Bloomberg database ceases to be available, such alternative publication or service as the Compensation Committee shall designate).
The number of TSR Performance Shares that will vest and be paid will depend upon the Company’s performance relative to the Report Group, and not upon the absolute level of return achieved by the Company. The Compensation Committee established five percentile rankings that will determine the number of TSR Performance Shares to vest and be paid: (i) less than 25th, (ii) 25th, (iii) 50th, and (iv) 100th. These percentile rankings will result in vesting and payment of a percentage of the TSR Target Opportunity, as follows: (i) 0%, (ii) 50%, (iii) 100%, and (iv) 200%, respectively. For example, if the Company’s performance were to place it at the 50th percentile of the Report Group, then 100% of the TSR Target Opportunity would vest and be paid. For performance between two established performance levels, the percentage of TSR Performance Shares to vest and be paid will be determined by mathematical interpolation. Notwithstanding the above, if the Company’s three-year total shareholder return is negative, then the percentage of the TSR Target Opportunity to be paid will be capped at 100%. TSR Performance Shares that do not vest will be automatically forfeited when the Compensation Committee makes its determination as to the extent to which the performance goal has been achieved, but no later than March 15, 2028.